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MISTAKES ABOUT INTENTION  
IN THE LAW OF BIOETHICS 
MICHAEL P. MORELAND* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Much of law and ethics at the end of life turns on whether there is a moral 
and legal distinction between killing and letting die. That distinction, in turn, 
relies on a difference between intention (what one purposely aims to bring 
about in his actions) and foresight (what one merely believes to be likely or 
even substantially certain). On this distinction rests the plausibility of the legal 
prohibition against physician-assisted suicide and many other important moral 
and legal prohibitions in bioethics, the ethics of warfare, and much else. The 
distinction between intention and foresight is the subject of frequent 
philosophical and legal criticism, ranging from Thomas Scanlon’s recent book 
Moral Dimensions (the first chapter of which is devoted to an argument against 
the principle of the double effect and the intention–foresight distinction) to 
legal scholarship.1 
My goal in this article is to bring the work of Stanley Hauerwas to bear on 
the law of bioethics, which I will accomplish through a discussion of how 
debates over intention in moral philosophy, moral theology, and law have 
shaped—and confused—bioethics. Writing about Stanley Hauerwas on law and 
bioethics may strike those who know Hauerwas’s work as an odd project—just 
as Peter Geach noted in his essay The Religion of Thomas Hobbes that perhaps 
he had chosen to write on an empty subject, much like G.K. Chesterton’s Lord 
Darnaway put such titles as The Snakes of Ireland and The Religion of Frederick 
the Great on the spines of the dummy books in his library.2 So also one might 
think about “Hauerwas on bioethics and law,” for one of Hauerwas’s (mostly 
salutary, to my view) contributions to theological bioethics has been his 
persistent refusal to acquiesce to the overly professionalized and bureaucratic  
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 1.  THOMAS M. SCANLON, MORAL DIMENSIONS: PERMISSIBILITY, MEANING, BLAME (2008). 
 2.  Peter Geach, The Religion of Thomas Hobbes, 17 RELIGIOUS STUDIES 549 (1981). 
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set of concerns that dominate the field of bioethics today.3 If that is true of 
“bioethics,” it is even more so with “law” on account of Hauerwas’s suspicion of 
the modern nation-state and its dominant political and legal forms.4 
But there is more to be said about “Hauerwas on bioethics and law” than 
might appear, for much of Hauerwas’s criticism of theological bioethics applies 
to the law of bioethics, as well. More specifically, the area of law that largely 
gave rise to law and bioethics—intentional torts in the law of informed consent 
and battery—has become muddled in ways that Hauerwas’s own critique of 
bioethics and his earliest work in the philosophy of action indicate. Part II of 
this article sets forth Hauerwas’s early work on intention in moral theory and 
bioethics, as well as the broader moral, philosophical, and theological 
framework of that work. Part III moves to the topic of intention in tort law. 
Drawing on the historical and jurisprudential work of James Gordley, John 
Finnis, John Goldberg, and Benjamin Zipursky, I argue that the twentieth 
century trend away from an understanding of tort law as a manifestation of 
Aristotelian commutative justice (or simply tort as a “wrong”) has deprived tort 
law of an adequate account of intentional wrongdoing. In part IV, I argue that 
this shift in tort law’s historical and philosophical understanding of intentional 
wrongdoing has played out specifically (and detrimentally) in the law of 
bioethics by making it ever more difficult to distinguish between intention and 
foresight. The early law of bioethics—centered on the concepts of informed 
consent and battery—assumed a background of Aristotelian commutative 
justice along with the robust account of intention that Hauerwas, among others, 
has defended. Deprived of that basis, the law of bioethics has increasingly 
become unable to make the necessary distinctions between purposely harmful 
acts and acts that cause harm as a side effect. I will focus on one consequence of 
this loss: the confusion in the physician-assisted suicide debate over whether the  
 
 3.  For the history of how bioethics was transformed from a subfield of moral philosophy and 
moral theology into an autonomous discipline, see JOHN H. EVANS, PLAYING GOD?: HUMAN GENETIC 
ENGINEERING AND THE RATIONALIZATION OF PUBLIC BIOETHICAL DEBATE (2002); ALBERT R. 
JONSEN, THE BIRTH OF BIOETHICS (2003); and DAVID J. ROTHMAN, STRANGERS AT THE BEDSIDE: A 
HISTORY OF HOW LAW AND BIOETHICS TRANSFORMED MEDICAL DECISION MAKING (1992). 
Hauerwas has frequently distanced himself from the “bioethicist” label: 
Our problem is simply that in the absence of any good beyond our basic physical survival, we 
lack any sense of what limits might be placed on the good that medicine serves . . . . Any 
attempt to limit medical care in such a context cannot help but appear arbitrary and cruel. As 
a result, medical care becomes increasingly just another form of liberal bureaucracy that must 
be subject to the same kinds of rules so characteristic of the wider political life. I therefore 
take medical ethics to be but one form which that kind of bureaucratic maintenance assumes. 
That, of course, is why I do not aspire to be a medical ethicist. 
STANLEY HAUERWAS, Communitarians and Medical Ethicists: Or “Why I Am None of the Above”, 
 in DISPATCHES FROM THE FRONT: THEOLOGICAL ENGAGEMENTS WITH THE SECULAR 153, 162 
(1994). 
 4.  See, e.g., Stanley Hauerwas, On Being a Christian and an American, in A BETTER HOPE: 
RESOURCES FOR A CHURCH CONFRONTING CAPITALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND POSTMODERNITY 23 
(2000). 
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distinction between withdrawing treatment and acting to cause the patient’s  
death is morally and legally defensible. 
II 
INTENTION IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY AND MORAL THEOLOGY 
A.   Hauerwas and Anscombe on Intention 
Even avid readers of Hauerwas’s work over the past forty years might forget 
that much of his earliest work was on the philosophy of action, intention, and 
how intention relates to character and the virtues.5 By immersing himself in 
disputes about the philosophy of action and intention, Hauerwas was able to 
develop an account of the virtues as arising from a character-constituting set of 
intentional acts. Building on Elizabeth Anscombe’s watershed work on 
intention,6 Hauerwas argued in the early 1970s that 
there is a vast difference between calling human action purposive and calling it 
intentional. The concept of intention is confined in its application to language-using, 
reflective creatures who are able to characterize their own conduct, whereas the 
concept of purpose is not so limited. Only men can be characterized as intending what 
they do, whereas animals may be said to have purposes. Thus to argue that action is 
basically intentional is to point to the fact that action can only ultimately be described 
and understood by reference to the intention of the agent. Only the agent can supply 
the correct description of an action, whereas purpose can be characterized from the 
observer’s point of view.
7
 
Though Hauerwas’s initial work in the actual field of bioethics was a decade 
away,8 his initial foray into an issue of significance to bioethics was here, in his 
early writings on the problem of intention as it emerged from the context of 
twentieth century debates in moral philosophy and moral theology.9 
In the law of bioethics, intention has often been discussed in the context of  
the principle of double effect.10 Anscombe’s work situates the current debate: 
 
 5.  As Hauerwas writes in his memoir about his early work, “I was reading Charles Taylor, Stuart 
Hampshire, and Elizabeth Anscombe to try and develop an account of agency.” STANLEY HAUERWAS, 
HANNAH’S CHILD: A THEOLOGIAN’S MEMOIR 68 (2010). 
 6.  G.E.M. ANSCOMBE, INTENTION (2d ed. 1963). 
 7.  STANLEY HAUERWAS, VISION AND VIRTUE 56–57 (1974) [hereinafter HAUERWAS, VISION 
AND VIRTUE]. See also STANLEY HAUERWAS, CHARACTER AND THE CHRISTIAN LIFE: A STUDY IN 
THEOLOGICAL ETHICS 100–06 (1975) [hereinafter HAUERWAS, CHARACTER AND THE CHRISTIAN 
LIFE] (discussing the intention and descriptions of action). 
 8.  Hauerwas’s first collection of essays on bioethics was STANLEY HAUERWAS, SUFFERING 
PRESENCE: THEOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS ON MEDICINE, THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED AND THE 
CHURCH (1986). 
 9.  For an extended discussion of the influence of Anscombe on Hauerwas, see MARK RYAN, 
THE POLITICS OF PRACTICAL REASON (2011). 
 10.  Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Toward Understanding the Principle of Double Effect, 90 ETHICS 527, 
528 (1980) (“The classic modern formulation of the PDE is presented in J. P. Gury’s widely used and 
often revised manual, Compendium theologiae moralis: ‘It is licit to posit a cause which is either good or 
indifferent from which there follows a twofold effect, one good, the other evil, if a proportionately 
grave reason is present, and if the end of the agent is honorable—that is, if he does not intend the evil 
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throughout her career, she maintained an interest both in theoretical issues in 
the philosophy of action and in defending a traditional formulation of the 
principle of double effect. Anscombe used double effect to analyze moral issues 
in the ethics of war and other topics.11 For example, Anscombe argued that the 
obliteration bombing of cities during World War II was immoral on account of 
the absolute prohibition on intentionally killing the innocent and the Allies’ 
abuse of double-effect reasoning to justify such indiscriminate bombing.12 The 
opposition to “consequentialism” (a term coined by Anscombe to denote much 
of English moral philosophy since the utilitarian Henry Sidgwick) that drives 
much of Anscombe’s classic paper Modern Moral Philosophy is due, she argues, 
to the consequentialist conflation of the distinction between intended and 
foreseen consequences.13 As summarized by Anscombe in her well known paper 
War and Murder, “[t]he denial of [the principle of double effect] has been the 
corruption of non-Catholic thought, and its abuse the corruption of Catholic 
thought.”14 
Anscombe’s landmark essay Modern Moral Philosophy and her monograph 
Intention resurrected interest in and launched much of the current debate about 
the philosophy of action.15 Anscombe’s warning to the moral philosophers of her 
day—that, in the absence of an adequate moral psychology and account of 
action (including intention), moral philosophy should be abandoned—persists 
 
effect.’ In a clarification of this statement Gury makes it clear that the PDE contains four conditions, all 
of which together are required for the type of act in question to be licit: (1) the agent’s end must be 
morally acceptable (honestus), (2) the cause must be good or at least indifferent, (3) the good effect 
must be immediate, and (4) there must be a grave reason for positing the cause.”). 
 11.  See, e.g., 3 G.E.M. ANSCOMBE, The Justice of the Present War Examined, in THE COLLECTED 
PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS OF G.E.M. ANSCOMBE: ETHICS, RELIGION AND POLITICS 72 (1981). 
 12.  Id. at 78–79. 
 13.  3 G.E.M. ANSCOMBE, Modern Moral Philosophy, in THE COLLECTED PHILOSOPHICAL 
PAPERS OF G.E.M. ANSCOMBE, supra note 11, at 26, 33–34. Anscombe noted that Sidgwick’s massive 
influence on English-speaking moral philosophy was because of his denial of any distinction between 
responsibility for foreseen consequences and responsibility for intended consequences of an act: “This 
move on the part of Sidgwick explains the difference between old-fashioned Utilitarianism and that 
consequentialism, as I name it, which marks him and every English academic moral philosopher since 
him.” Id. at 12 (emphasis in original). 
 14.  3 G.E.M. ANSCOMBE, War and Murder, in THE COLLECTED PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS OF 
G.E.M. ANSCOMBE, supra note 11, at 51, 54. As a historical matter, the principle of double effect did not 
attain widespread use in moral theology until approximately 1630 under the Portuguese Thomist, John 
of St. Thomas. See Joseph T. Mangan, An Historical Analysis of the Principle of Double Effect, 10 
THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 40, 41 (1949); JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., CONTRACEPTION: A HISTORY OF ITS 
TREATMENT BY THE CATHOLIC THEOLOGIANS AND CANONISTS 541 n.48 (1965). Philippa Foot argued 
that the principle of double effect’s strength is in its distinction between what one does (denoted by 
Foot as “direct” intention) and what one allows (denoted as “oblique” intention). Phillipa Foot, The 
Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect, in VIRTUES AND VICES AND OTHER 
ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 19, 25 (1978). Foot eventually argued against the widespread 
applicability of double effect reasoning, but her insight on the strength of the direct–oblique intention 
distinction remains valuable. 
 15.  G.E.M. ANSCOMBE, INTENTION (2d ed. 1963). Donald Davidson remarked that Anscombe’s 
book was the most important contribution to the philosophy of action since Aristotle. See DONALD 
DAVIDSON, Aristotle’s Action, in TRUTH, LANGUAGE, AND HISTORY 277, 283 (2005). 
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today, especially in applying the principle of the double effect. Among the  
conditions of the principle of double effect is a distinction between the intended  
and (merely) foreseen consequences of one’s actions.16 Much turns, then, on the 
sense in which one does (or does not) act intentionally when bringing about 
some harmful effect. It is at this point that the principle of double effect 
depends upon the resolution of problems in the philosophy of action. 
My brief summary of some important aspects of Anscombe’s account of 
intention relies on two arguments from the beginning of her monograph 
Intention.17 First, she asserts that the “different senses” of intention in (a) “I am 
going to do such-and-such” (what we might term “predictive intention”), (b) 
acting intentionally, and (c) acting with intention are “clearly not equivocal.”18 
To hold that intention in those different uses is equivocal or ambiguous would 
be, in Anscombe’s words, “implausible.” However, she simply notes this fact and 
moves on to “tak[e] [the] topic piecemeal” throughout the rest of the book.19 Of 
course, “intention” in all three uses is linguistically univocal—if by that we mean 
that the same term (intention) is used in three different kinds of expression. 
One suspects, however, that Anscombe’s opposition (following Wittgenstein) to 
ascribing each different use of “intention” to a different mental state (a more 
plausible view) drives her assertion that the three uses of intention in different 
linguistic expressions are unambiguous and univocal.20 
The second claim—already implicit in the first—is that intention cannot be 
the expression of a mental state. Anscombe inveighs against the view that “if we 
wish to understand what intention is, we must be investigating something whose 
existence is purely in the sphere of the mind.”21 This is so because “Wittgenstein 
has shown the impossibility of answering the question” of what a person’s 
intention is by reference to mental states.22 In a later paper, Anscombe argues 
that those who hold that intention “can’t be known to anyone but the agent” 
(holding, in other words, a reductive variant of mentalist intention) “have been  
 
 16.  In the traditional formulation of the principle of double effect, an action with both a good and  
bad effect is morally permissible if (1) the act is morally good or indifferent, (2) the agent intends only 
the good effect and merely foresees the bad effect, (3) the good effect is not brought about by means of 
the bad effect, and (4) the good effect is proportionate to the bad effect. I agree with commentators 
who suggest that the second condition does considerably more work than the other three, particularly 
insofar as the scope of permitted acts under condition (1) is partly determined by how one parses the 
distinction between intention and mere foresight in condition (2). See, e.g., R.A. Duff, Absolute 
Principles and Double Effect, 36 ANALYSIS 68, 74 (1976); see also, Alison McIntyre, Doing Away with 
Double Effect, 111 ETHICS 219 (2001). 
 17.  ANSCOMBE, supra note 15. 
 18.  Id. at § 1. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  But see id. at § 27 (arguing for a limited role for “interior performance” in determining 
intentions). 
 21.  Id. at § 4. 
 22.  Id. at § 3. 
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misled by bad teaching” insofar as this view is “in general absurd.”23 Inspired 
partly by Anscombe, Hauerwas argues that 
[m]an’s capacity for self-determination is dependent on his ability to envision and fix 
his attention on certain descriptions and to form his actions (and thus his self) in 
accordance with them. A man’s character is largely the result of such sustained 
attention. His reasons for action, his motives and intentions are really explanatory 
because they are the essential aspect in the formation of the act and consequently in 
his own formation. His reasons do not “cause” him to act, but by embodying them he 
as the agent effects the corresponding action.
24
 
B.   Intention in Twentieth Century Catholic Moral Theology 
During the last half of the twentieth century, the debate in Catholic moral 
theology over intention was concurrent with, but largely separate from, the 
argument over intention in Anglo-American moral philosophy. The separation 
was for reasons of linguistic, sociological, and intellectual isolation. Since the 
seventeenth century, the dominant methodology in Catholic moral theology had 
been that of the moral manuals used in the education of clergy.25 Beginning in 
the years preceding Vatican II, Continental theologians such as Bernard Häring, 
Joseph Fuchs, and Peter Knauer faulted these manuals for their physicalist 
understanding of human action. They were followed in this assessment by 
American figures such as Richard McCormick, S.J. (one of the fathers of 
American bioethics along with such figures as Paul Ramsey and Daniel 
Callahan).26 The manuals, these theologians argued, were so concentrated on the 
physical description of action and the enumeration of sins that they offered a 
distorted view of moral agency by neglecting virtues and intentions. 
Although the history of twentieth century Catholic moral theology is 
complex and rife with academic and ecclesiastical subplots,27 the central debate 
was arguably over the application of the principle of double effect to 
 
 23.  G.E.M. Anscombe, Medalist’s Address: Action, Intention, and “Double Effect”, 56 PROC. AM. 
CATHOLIC PHIL. ASS’N 12, 18 (1982). 
 24.  HAUERWAS, VISION AND VIRTUE, supra note 7, at 58. 
 25.  JOHN MAHONEY, THE MAKING OF MORAL THEOLOGY: A STUDY OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC 
TRADITION (1989). During the sixth century, “moral manuals” were initially used as a guide that 
instructed monks on the on various sins and the sacrament of penance. By the Middle Ages, the 
manuals of moral theology had evolved, largely due to the work of Thomas Aquinas, into instructive 
manuals that not only enumerated sins and their corresponding penance, but also described to the 
clergy how exactly to administer appropriate penance and punishment for sins, resulting in a more 
utilitarian use of the manuals in the seminaries themselves. 
 26.  See, e.g., RICHARD A. MCCORMICK, HOW BRAVE A NEW WORLD?: DILEMMAS IN 
BIOETHICS (1986); RICHARD A. MCCORMICK, NOTES ON MORAL THEOLOGY 1981 THROUGH 1984 
(1984); RICHARD A. MCCORMICK, NOTES ON MORAL THEOLOGY 1965 THROUGH 1980 (1981). 
 27.  Hauerwas has occasionally commented upon these intramural disputes within Catholic moral 
theology. See, e.g., STANLEY HAUERWAS, Gay Friendship: A Thought Experiment in Catholic Moral 
Theology, in SANCTIFY THEM IN THE TRUTH: HOLINESS EXEMPLIFIED 105, 110 (1998) (“At least one 
of the lessons we need to learn from recent debates in Catholic moral theology is that it is a 
dangerously over-determined tradition. For example, when you identify grace with a ‘fundamental 
option,’ and specify ‘biblical theology’ by a concept like ‘covenant,’ you have an indication that moral 
theology has become so specialized it is by no means clear what it means for it to be called theology.”). 
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particularly difficult moral questions, many drawn from bioethics. The principle 
of double effect, purportedly derivable from Aquinas’s analysis of killing in self- 
defense, includes, as noted earlier, the condition that one may not directly  
intend the evil effect of an act that has both good and evil effects. Peter 
Knauer’s 1967 article The Hermeneutic Function of the Principle of Double 
Effect led to a trend in moral theology that replaced the moral analysis of the 
manuals with an emphasis on the intentions of agents to act proportionally for 
the greater good.28 The manuals had offered a catalog of sins and potential 
exceptions to them through the application of the principle of double effect. 
Proportionalists, as they came to be known, responded by labeling the manualist 
understanding “physicalist” and “casuistic.” The proportionalists argued for an 
alternative interpretation in which the exercise of reason to intend the greater 
good in a situation of conflicting goods justified certain acts.29 In this 
development, intention—or at least one account of it—became the crucial 
concept. According to the revisionist moral theologians, the totality of factors in 
a moral act, including the circumstances and the agent’s intention, should be 
considered, as opposed to the allegedly “photographic” or non-contextual 
assessment of action imputed to the manuals. 
McCormick and other proportionalists claimed that their account returned 
the agent’s intention to its rightfully central place in moral evaluation and 
escaped the physicalist account found in the manuals. In turn, John Finnis and 
Martin Rhonheimer have argued that proportionalism should be considered a 
species of the “consequentialism” that Anscombe rightly attacked.30 The 
argument between these two positions was sharpened by the claim of both 
parties to offer an interpretation of Aquinas. Among the proportionalists, both 
Knauer and Louis Janssens claimed Aquinas for their position.31 Finnis and 
Rhonheimer responded in kind, writing expositions of Aquinas’s doctrine of 
intention and object in moral judgment (Finnis) and the Thomist inspiration of 
Veritatis Splendor (Rhonheimer).32 Veritatis Splendor includes an attack on  
 
 28.  See Peter Knauer, The Hermeneutic Function of the Principle of Double Effect, in 1 READINGS 
IN MORAL THEOLOGY: MORAL NORMS AND CATHOLIC TRADITION 1 (Charles Curran & Richard 
McCormick, S.J. eds., 1979). 
 29.  For a history of the moral manuals and the reaction against them, see JOHN GALLAGHER, 
TIME PAST, TIME FUTURE: A HISTORICAL STUDY OF CATHOLIC MORAL THEOLOGY (1990); 
MAHONEY, supra note 25. For a sympathetic portrayal of proportionalism, see BERNARD HOOSE, 
PROPORTIONALISM: THE AMERICAN DEBATE AND ITS EUROPEAN ROOTS (1987). For an 
unsympathetic view, see JOHN FINNIS, MORAL ABSOLUTES: TRADITION, REVISION, AND TRUTH 
(1991). 
 30.  For the place of intention and the philosophy of action in the proportionalist debate and a 
proposed solution to the impasse in the debate, see Michael J. Quirk, Why the Debate on 
Proportionalism is Misconceived, 13 MODERN THEOLOGY 501 (1997). 
 31.  See Louis Janssens, Ontic Evil and Moral Evil, 4 LOUVAIN STUDIES 115 (1972). 
 32.  See John Finnis, Object and Intention in Moral Judgments According to Aquinas, 55 THOMIST 1 
(1991); JOHN FINNIS, AQUINAS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL THEORY 139 (1998); Martin 
Rhonheimer, “Intrinsically Evil Acts” and the Moral Viewpoint: Clarifying a Central Teaching of Veritatis 
Splendor, 58 THOMIST 1 (1994); Intentional Actions and the Meaning of Object: A Reply to Richard 
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proportionalism, though a new debate arose over whether the encyclical  
criticized merely a caricature of proportionalism.33 
Hauerwas largely and wisely sidestepped the proportionalist debate, but he 
was one of the first non-Catholics in the field of Christian ethics to take 
Aquinas seriously and he relied on aspects of Aquinas’s account of intention in 
his early work.34 Aquinas’s account of intention is best viewed through two 
contexts: (1) its relationship to end and object in moral action, and (2) its 
relation to the virtues. As I. T. Eschmann argues, at the heart of Thomistic ethics 
is the concept of action for an end: 
The accent on “the end” is quite purposeful in the “treatise on morals.” “End” or the 
“Order of the end” carries of itself the morally decisive notions of the moral good and 
evil which, again with the idea of the end, are susceptible of an immediate elaboration 
[in Summa Contra Gentiles III.9] by bringing out the idea of “measure,” of “reason.”
35
 
Intention, understood in this moral context, is the “determination of the will 
to will the end.”36 Any account of intention, then, will have to explore the nature 
of moral action for an end.37 In his initial work on Aquinas, Hauerwas also calls 
attention to the significance of “end” for Aquinas’ account of intention: “For 
Aquinas this means that choice is the result of man’s intention, for intention (in-
tention) is the inclining of the will toward its object.”38 
Second, just as action for an end figures pivotally in Aquinas, so also 
intention is significant for an ethic of the virtues, particularly prudence, which 
Hauerwas noted in his early work: 
Character is thus the qualification of our self-agency, formed by our having certain 
intentions (and beliefs) rather than others. Character is not a mere public appearance 
that leaves a more fundamental self hidden; it is the very reality of who we are as self-
 
McCormick, 59 THOMIST 279 (1995). 
 33.  See collected essays in CONSIDERING VERITATIS SPLENDOR (John Wilkens ed., 1994), 
especially those by Richard McCormick, Bernard Haring, John Finnis, Germain Grisez, Herbert 
McCabe, and Lisa Sowle Cahill. For a discussion of Veritatis Splendor from Hauerwas, see STANLEY 
HAUERWAS, IN GOOD COMPANY: THE CHURCH AS POLIS (1997). 
 34.  Hauerwas’s mentors at Yale included some of the initial American Protestant Christian 
ethicists who engaged Aquinas. See JAMES GUSTAFSON, PROTESTANT AND ROMAN CATHOLIC 
ETHICS: PROSPECTS FOR RAPPROCHEMENT (1978); GEORGE A. LINDBECK, THE NATURE OF 
DOCTRINE: RELIGION AND THEOLOGY IN A POSTLIBERAL AGE (1984). 
 35.  I.T. ESCHMANN, THE ETHICS OF SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS: TWO COURSES 55 (Edward Synan 
ed., 1997). 
 36.  Id. at 60. 
 37.  The problem is complicated by the introduction of the term “object,” for the relation of the end 
and the object of acts is a delicate question to which Aquinas devotes considerable attention. Not 
surprisingly, it is in debates over interpretation of the “end” in action (action’s “teleological” character) 
and whether action is “for an end” that lies at the root of much contemporary disagreement on 
intention. “The loss of the reality of the object of intention in modern thought,” writes Daniel Westberg, 
“has led to unfortunate consequences and misinterpretations of the theory of St. Thomas. . . . This can be 
explained by the separation of finis and objectum such that the actual object of the action understood in 
an exterior sense was demoted to an ‘accidental value,’ while what was important was the subjective 
intention.” DANIEL WESTBERG, RIGHT PRACTICAL REASON: ARISTOTLE, ACTION, AND PRUDENCE IN 
AQUINAS 143 (1994). 
 38.  HAUERWAS, CHARACTER AND THE CHRISTIAN LIFE, supra note 7, at 65. 
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determining agents. . . . Our character is our deliberate disposition to use a certain 
range of reasons for actions rather than others (such a range is usually what is meant 
by moral vision), for it is by having reasons and forming our actions accordingly that 
our character is at once revealed and molded.
39
 
But other than occasional references in some works on the moral theory of 
the virtues,40 the role of intention has often been consigned to a discrete and 
atomistic depiction of human action.41 Actions are often described apart from 
the character of the agent, leading to the problem of how to denote the 
intention in an act of “killing,” for example. Furthermore, and as a result of this 
portrayal of action (in both the proportionalist debate and in much of twentieth 
century moral philosophy), intention is conceived merely as a mental property 
of moral agents, not primarily as a term of moral analysis and description.42 As 
summarized by Anscombe, “The intentionalness of an action,” in the mentalist 
view, “can’t be known to anyone but the agent.”43 Fergus Kerr, amid a discussion 
of Wittgenstein’s significance for Catholic moral theology, observes that such a 
“mentalist individualism in epistemology breeds what has been called radical 
volitionism as regards human action.”44 By contrast, Aquinas argues that 
intention is the term applied to the act of the will tending toward the end at 
which an action aims, and such a description is possible only in light of the  
virtues one possesses or fails to possess.45 Intentions emerge from character, just 
 
 39.  HAUERWAS, VISION AND VIRTUE, supra note 7, at 59. 
 40.  See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 210 (3d ed. 2007); PETER GEACH, THE VIRTUES 
(1977). 
 41.  For a criticism of such accounts, see Charles Taylor, Explaining Action, 13 INQUIRY 54 (1970). 
 42.  See Alasdair MacIntyre, How Moral Agents Became Ghosts or Why the History of Ethics 
Diverged from that of the Philosophy of Mind, 53 SYNTHESE 295 (1982). 
 43.  G.E.M. Anscombe, Medalist’s Address: Action, Intention, and “Double Effect,” 56 PROC. AM. 
CATHOLIC PHIL. ASS’N 12, 18 (1982). In Intention, Anscombe notes that “it can easily seem that in 
general the question what a man’s intentions are is only authoritatively settled by him.” ANSCOMBE, 
supra note 15, at 9. “Hence,” she contends, “if we wish to understand what intention is, we must be 
investigating something whose existence is purely in the sphere of mind; and that although intention 
issues in actions, and the way this happens also presents interesting questions, still what physically takes 
place, i.e. what a man actually does, is the very last thing we need consider in our enquiry. Whereas I 
wish to say that it is the first.” Id. 
 44.  FERGUS KERR, THEOLOGY AFTER WITTGENSTEIN 173 (2d ed. 1997). The mistake in the 
“mentalist” view, according to Kerr (and also Anscombe), is to depict intentions as a mental property 
known privately by the agent. 
 45.  Following the questions on the voluntary and involuntary, questions eight to twelve of the 
Prima secundae are concerned with “those acts of the will whereby it is moved to the end.” “It seems 
that there are three acts of the will in reference to the end,” Aquinas writes, “volition, enjoyment, and 
intention” (I-II, 8. prologue). Question twelve takes up intention and is divided by Aquinas into five 
articles. Two topics will be explored in these articles: (1) the relation of intention and ends of human 
action, and (2) the entailment of ends and means in action, the focus of article four, bearing upon 
intention and election. A third problem, the assessment of good and evil in human acts and intention’s 
role in moral judgment, will conclude the chapter, using I-II, 19.7 and 8. The former asks “whether the 
goodness of the will, as regards the means, depends on the intention of the end” (a Thomistic variation 
of the Abelardian problem whether a good end justifies a bad means). The latter article elaborates upon 
the previous article by introducing considerations of degree. 
  In the Secunda secundae, Aquinas considers particular virtues and employs the account of 
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as the virtues specify such character, and character shapes intentions. It is not 
surprising, then, that Anscombe’s article and book, which played such an 
important role in both the renewal of the philosophy of action and the analysis 
of intention, have also been taken by Hauerwas and others as a source for the 
recovery of virtue ethics in contemporary moral philosophy. 
III 
INTENTION IN THE LAW OF BIOETHICS 
With this highly selective account of intention in recent moral philosophy 
and theology as background, I turn to the legal implications of confusion about 
intention. Such issues as intention from the philosophy of action are part of 
several areas of legal doctrine. For example, the criminal law doctrine of mens 
rea and the elaboration in the Model Penal Code of different mental states 
(namely, purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence), are rife with 
philosophical discussions of intention and action theory.46 In tort law, the 
question of when one may be held liable for one’s actions turns on topics such 
as intention, foresight, and standards of care, all of which are pertinent to the 
philosophy of action. Nonetheless, legal scholars have, for the most part, been 
reluctant to engage the philosophical and theological work on intention and 
seldom mine such debates for their legal implications. 
A.   Battery and Informed Consent in the Law of Bioethics 
Before turning to the muddle of intention in contemporary tort law, I begin 
with how the law of bioethics came to be framed around intentional torts, 
specifically the tort of battery and lack of informed consent. The rise of 
informed consent over the course of the twentieth century and its 
predominance in the law of bioethics today might obscure the relative novelty 
of informed consent in medical practice. Indeed, physicians have not always 
been required to obtain a patient’s consent for medical procedures, and for 
some time obtaining consent was actively discouraged. In ancient Greece, for 
example, it was considered undesirable for patients to be involved in  
 
intention elaborated in the Prima secundae. In relation to the second sub-question of the problem (the 
relation of intention and virtue), acts pertaining to two virtues will be examined. In the treatment of  
charity, Aquinas takes up the issue of war. A necessary component of a just war, he argues, is that those 
making war have recta intentio (II-II, 40.1). In the consideration of justice, two acts are analyzed in 
which intention plays a significant role in evaluating the action. In killing in self-defense, Aquinas uses 
the famous concept of praeter intentionem (II-II, 64.7), and the later tradition will derive the principle of 
double effect from this. At II-II, 110.1, also pertaining to the virtue of justice, Aquinas argues that the 
intention to deceive is of decisive importance in the ethics of lying and truth-telling. 
 46.  For a critical discussion of the role of Glanville Williams in importing a utilitarian account of 
intention and foresight into the Model Penal Code and the law of bioethics in both the United 
Kingdom and the United States, see John Keown & David Jones, Surveying the Foundations of Medical 
Law: A Reassessment of Glanville Williams’s The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law, 16 MED. L. REV. 
85 (2008). 
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decisionmaking for medical treatment.47 In the Middle Ages, physicians were 
permitted to be manipulative and deceitful when necessary. Views began to 
change as patients came to be seen as capable of listening to physicians, but 
deception was still thought to be occasionally necessary for patient care. In the 
1800s, physicians began to consider that patients should be informed of dire 
prognoses, but most still thought that patients should not be fully informed of 
their conditions. 
The tort of battery (an unconsented-to touching) formed the basis of a claim 
against a physician for performing surgery without consent.48 The usual cite for 
establishing the link between battery and medical treatment without consent is 
to Judge Cardozo’s opinion in Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital: 
“Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine 
what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an 
operation without his patient’s consent, commits an assault, for which he is 
liable in damages.”49 The conventional view is that Judge Cardozo’s assertion in 
Schloendorff led, however inchoately, to a patient’s right to self-determination 
and informed consent, thereby providing the initial framework for the later 
elaboration of a set of doctrines in the law of bioethics. For example, Kellen 
Rodriguez argues that the principle that non-consensual medical treatment is a 
battery was first articulated in Schloendorff,50 and Danuta Mendelson claims 
that Schloendorff expressly introduced the idea of a patient’s right to self-
determination.51 Similarly, H. Tristam Engelhardt argues that Schloendorff 
founded a patient’s right to consent to and refuse treatment based on patient 
autonomy.52 
 
 
 47.  See RUTH R. FADEN ET AL., A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT 53–101 
(1986); Peter M. Murray, The History of Informed Consent, 10 IOWA ORTHOPAEDIC J. 104, 104 (1990). 
 48.  Marjorie Maguire Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected Interest, 
95 YALE L.J. 219, 224 (1985). 
 49.  Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914). 
 50.  Kellen F. Rodriguez, Suing Health Care Providers for Saving Lives, 20 J. LEGAL MED. 1, 12 
(1999). 
 51.  Danuta Mendelson, Historical Evolution and Modern Implications of Concepts of Consent to, 
and Refusal of, Medical Treatment in the Law of Trespass, 17 J. LEGAL MED 1, 20 (1996). 
 52.  H. TRISTRAM ENGELHARDT, JR., FOUNDATIONS OF BIOETHICS 264 (1986). Others, however, 
argue that Judge Cardozo’s opinion has been given an unduly important role in articulating the 
importance of informed consent and should be viewed as merely stating widely accepted legal doctrine 
at the time. By 1914, it was arguably well-settled that a patient’s consent was required before medical 
treatment could be provided—indeed, Judge Cardozo himself must have been aware of this because he 
authoritatively cites Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261 (1905), and Pratt v. Davis, 118 Ill. App. 161 (1905), 
both of which were cases in which defendants were found liable for battery because they performed 
treatment without a patient’s consent. See Paul A. Lombardo, Phantom Tumors and Hysterical Women: 
Revising our View of the Schloendorff Case, 33 J.L. MED & ETHICS 791, 798 (2005). Similarly, Jay Katz 
has argued that the case should be memorable not for a pronouncement of self-determination, but 
rather for the unfortunate necessity reminding physicians of such an elementary restraint on their 
authority. See JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 52 (1984). 
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Regardless of the credit Judge Cardozo’s opinion in Schloendorff deserves, 
consent has been incorporated into the law of bioethics through the common 
law tort of battery, even if the protection that battery-defined consent provides 
patients might be inadequate. For example, if a particular action does not  
involve touching (such as a decision not to treat), then a patient’s right to 
consent to the action would not be protected.53 Also, in cases where medical 
intervention leads to harm, a doctor who would ordinarily be liable for 
malpractice but did not want to disclose pertinent facts might violate the 
patient’s right to informed consent but would probably not be liable under a 
traditional battery analysis.54 Finally, some have noted that courts are wary of 
applying a doctrine shaped mostly by violent physical confrontations to the 
medical context. Consequently, the courts have limited battery claims to 
circumstances where a procedure is performed without any consent at all and 
have handled other cases of lack of fully informed consent as negligence 
claims.55 
In light of these problems with applying the doctrine of informed consent in 
medicine through battery principles, some have argued that battery-driven 
informed consent should be modified to afford greater protection to patient 
autonomy. This could be done by expanding the battery doctrine to apply to 
questions that would typically be analyzed under other doctrines of tort law, 
such as negligence.56 Shultz argues that some circumstances, such as conflicts of 
interest, call for stronger protection of patient interests and that battery should 
be applied to such cases.57 She also notes that courts do, and should, analyze 
cases in battery where optional treatments are involved.58 Shultz explains that 
this provides greater protection than mere negligence because battery rightly 
applies where there has not been consent. She also notes that determining 
whether to apply battery is difficult where a finding of consent rests on whether 
a treatment exceeded consent to a lesser procedure; courts, however, are most 
likely to apply it when cosmetic surgery or reproductive treatments are involved 
because both are optional.59 But some would modify battery-based consent to 
 
 53.  Shultz, supra note 48, at 229–30; see also Mendelson, supra note 51, at 39 (noting that an 
anomaly in legal rules relating to right of self-determination exists because a medical practitioner may 
refuse to administer treatment even if a patient requests it, but cannot ignore a patient’s request to be 
allowed to die). 
 54.  Shultz, supra note 48, at 260. 
 55.  Id. at 226. Pennsylvania treats lack of fully informed consent by a physician as battery, not 
negligence. See Montgomery v. Bazaz-Sehgal, 798 A.2d 742 (Pa. 2002). Conversely, there is a concern 
that enforcing consent in medical practice by way of rigid common law battery principles actually over- 
protects patients at the expense of physicians’ discretion. See Mendelson, supra note 51, at 20. 
 56.  Shultz, supra note 48, at 258–60 (noting that the court applied battery principles to the 
question of informed consent for prescription drugs, which would generally be resolved under 
negligence principles). 
 57.  Id. at 260. 
 58.  Id. at 264. 
 59.  Id. at 265–66. 
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apply in fewer circumstances and agree with the trend of applying battery only 
to situations where no consent was given whatsoever. Some would limit this  
even more by avoiding recognition of a battery claim when beneficial, non- 
consensual medical treatment has occurred.60 
Still, some would apply battery principles to every case involving informed 
consent in light of informed consent’s historical roots in battery.61 In Mink v. 
University of Chicago,62 a case in which the plaintiffs were administered DES 
during a research experiment, the plaintiffs brought both negligence and battery 
claims when alleging that an increased risk of cancer to their children had not 
been disclosed. Shultz pointed out that battery principles would not normally 
have fit because a prescription does not constitute contact and the plaintiffs 
voluntarily ingested the drug. Although the court rejected the negligence claim, 
the court was willing to characterize the nondisclosure as a battery, ignoring the 
absence of physical contact by explaining that the “gravamen of a battery action 
is the plaintiff’s lack of consent, not the form of touching.”63 
Another example comes from Morgan v. MacPhail,64 where a plaintiff sued 
her doctor for nondisclosure of potential side effects of nerve block injections. 
The court in Morgan decided to apply a battery analysis by distinguishing 
between surgical and medical treatments and holding that informed consent 
was only required for surgical procedures. Thus, the court decided that 
informed consent should apply only in circumstances that could give rise to 
traditional batteries. For the court, the invasive nature of surgery created the 
need to inform the patient of risks. But Grimm notes that the prevailing view is 
that informed consent is needed for all non-diagnostic medical procedures and 
that a negligence standard applies when evaluating the adequacy of the 
informed consent.65 
 
 
 60.  Mendelson, supra note 51, at 20. 
 61.  See Douglas Andrew Grimm, Informed Consent for All! No Exceptions, 37 N.M. L. REV. 39, 40 
(2007). 
 62.  Mink v. Univ. of Chi., 460 F. Supp. 713 (E.D. Ill. 1978) (One thousand women were given the 
drug Diethylstilbestrol (DES) as part of an experiment, carried out by Eli Lilly & Company, to 
determine the drug’s efficacy in preventing miscarriages while they were at the University of Chicago’s 
Hospital for prenatal care. The women were not told they were part of an experiment and were not told 
that the pills given to them were DES. The women claimed that their daughters were at an increased 
risk of cervical cancers due to the side effects of the drug, and brought both negligence and battery 
claims against Eli Lilly and the University of Chicago. The court characterized the action as a battery 
claim, and not a lack of informed consent claim rooted in negligence, and found that the administration 
of the drug was intentional and constituted contact, fulfilling the requirements for battery under Illinois 
state law. The court dismissed the defendant’s argument that the patient’s had consented to the 
touching when they admitted themselves to the hospital and stated that the administration of the drug 
DES clearly fell outside of what the patients had consented to upon admission to the hospital for 
prenatal care.). 
 63.  Shultz, supra note 48, at 258. 
 64.  Morgan v. MacPhail, 704 A.2d 617 (Pa. 1997). 
 65.  Grimm, supra note 61, at 66. 
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Most importantly for the law of bioethics at the end of life, similar questions 
arise when a patient (or a proxy decisionmaker) attempts to refuse or withdraw 
life-sustaining treatment. Because the unlawfulness of battery usually stems  
from non-consensual touching, contact does not need to be harmful to give rise 
to liability.66 Battery principles thus provide a foundation for an individual’s 
right to refuse medical treatment. As is often noted, the tort of battery is based 
on the rights of individual self-determination and autonomy.67 As illustrated by 
landmark informed consent cases such as Canterbury v. Spence,68 self-
determination gradually became more important in tort law and bioethics.  
Consequently, the right to refuse medical treatment became more firmly 
supported by battery principles. 
Battery arguably became the most plausible claim for tort recovery of 
unwanted life-sustaining medical treatment because it protects the fundamental 
right not to be touched without consent.69 Indeed, in Cruzan v. Director, 
Missouri Department of Health,70 the Supreme Court noted that battery is 
available to remedy a violation of the right to refuse medical treatment. 
Similarly, a state court in Leach v. Shapiro71 allowed the plaintiff to recover for 
a wrongful resuscitation on battery grounds, and the court in Bouvia v. Superior 
Court72 recognized a patient’s right to have a nasogastric tube withdrawn on the 
basis of a battery-based right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. 
Kellen Rodriguez examines the refusal of life-sustaining treatment from the 
perspective of both competent and incompetent patients. For competent 
patients, establishing a battery claim is fairly straightforward because the 
patient expresses wishes that the physician must then follow if the physician is 
to avoid liability.73 For incompetent patients (those unable to expressly state 
their wishes), however, it is less straightforward because they must convey their 
wishes through an advance directive or other proxy decision. Rodriguez notes 
that in a non-emergency situation where an incompetent person has left an 
 
 66.  S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy, Beyond Misguided Paternalism: Resuscitating the Right to Refuse 
Medical Treatment, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1035, 1044–45 (1998). 
 67.  See Shultz, supra note 48, at 224 (“Patient autonomy was initially identified with and subsumed 
under an interest in physical security, protected by rules proscribing unconsented touch. Medical care 
often involves touching, and may be considered battery if the touching is unconsented. By mandating 
patient consent to specific procedures, battery doctrine counters the implication that doctors acquire 
authority to make decisions simply by virtue of the contract for professional services. Moreover, 
professional competence is no defense to a medical battery action. Under battery analysis, the patient’s 
wishes take priority over even the fully competent recommendation of a doctor, unless an exception 
applies. Apart from traditional defenses, the right to be secure against unconsented touching is close to 
absolute. Application of battery doctrine to medical care thus establishes an uncompromising base-line 
of protection for patients’ self-determination.”). 
 68.  Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782–83 (1972); see also Mendelson, supra note 51, at 21. 
 69.  Rodriguez, supra note 50, at 13. 
 70.  Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
 71.  Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, 469 N.E.2d 1047 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984). 
 72.  Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Ct. App. 1986). 
 73.  Rodriguez, supra note 50, at 14. 
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advance directive or a surrogate testifies to the patient’s wishes, physicians are 
hesitant to withdraw treatment because they want to be absolutely sure the  
patient would have so decided.74 Conversely, some courts have held that  
physicians must seek consent from the patient or a surrogate before beginning 
life-sustaining treatment and that a battery claim exists for wrongfully 
maintaining the patient with the treatment.75 Rodriguez argues that in a non-
emergency, physicians should obtain consent or turn to an ethics committee or 
court before administering treatment.76 
Rodriguez notes that the approach differs for an incompetent patient during 
an emergency. Traditionally, consent is implied in an emergency, but Rodriguez 
explains that this does not apply when an advance directive has ordered refusal 
of treatment.77 Rodriguez points out that both Leach v. Shapiro and Anderson v. 
St. Francis–St. George Hospital78 support the view that implied consent during 
emergencies can be overcome by a prior decision to refuse treatment.79 
Even though battery principles seem applicable to cases involving a refusal 
of treatment and courts have sometimes applied them, there are still 
shortcomings to employing an account of consent developed through battery 
principles. One is that patient requests involve potential interpretive problems 
that make it difficult to determine if the contact was consensual. Even with 
competent patients, refusal of treatment can be ambiguous if overly broad 
language is used. Rodriguez explains that while doctors could simply ask for 
clarification, studies have shown they are hesitant to discuss life-sustaining 
treatment with patients, and a patient in need of such treatment is likely to be 
very ill and could quickly become incompetent as a result.80 Interpretive 
problems can also arise with the advance directives of incompetent patients.81 
For incompetent patients in emergency situations who have advance directives 
refusing treatment, there is the additional problem of ensuring that the 
emergency room staff is aware of the directive.82 
Overall, then, the tort of battery has had a considerable effect in developing 
the approaches taken by courts to issues of consent. When consent became 
incorporated into bioethics, it was still deeply influenced by the principles of 
intentional torts. Even today, battery has important implications for questions 
of consent—indeed, familiar cases involving simple questions of pure consent  
and botched surgeries on the wrong limb are far from things of the past.83 
 
 74.  Id. at 22. 
 75.  Id. at 23. 
 76.  Id. at 25. 
 77.  Id. at 32. 
 78.  Anderson v. St. Francis–St. George Hosp., Inc., 671 N.E.2d 225 (Ohio 1996). 
 79.  Rodriguez, supra note 50, at 32. 
 80.  Id. at 14. 
 81.  Id. at 27–28. 
 82.  Id. at 34. 
 83.  Sandra G. Boodman, The Pain of Wrong Site Surgery, WASH. POST, June 20, 2011, at E01, 
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B.   Confusion About Intention in the Law of Torts 
American tort law has, John Finnis writes, “generally embraced a position 
which at least in its formulation is congenial to utilitarian moral thought and far 
less congenial to traditional common morality.”84 Though the Restatement (First) 
of Torts in 1934 did not even set out to define “intention,” the Restatement 
(Second), issued in 1965, inserted a new section on intention. The section states, 
“The word ‘intent’ is used throughout the Restatement of this Subject to denote 
that the actor desires to cause the consequences of his act, or that he believes 
that the consequences are substantially certain to result from it.”85 Here, one 
already sees the collapse of any distinction between intention and foresight. In 
the Restatement (Third), the definition of intention expressly collapses the 
distinction between intention and foresight: “A person acts with the intent to 
produce a consequence if: (a) the person acts with the purpose of producing 
that consequence; or (b) the person acts knowing that the consequence is 
substantially certain to result.”86 
As noted above, the law of bioethics in the United States emerged from such 
discussions of intent in tort law, specifically the law of battery and informed 
consent.87 With this background, I want to revisit the perennial question of 
whether there is a moral, philosophical, or legal distinction between physician-
assisted suicide or forms of so-called “active” euthanasia and decisions to 
withhold or withdraw treatment. My purpose is to show some of the deeply 
confused and misguided understandings of intention in tort law, reflected most 
recently in the Restatement (Third) of Torts. If the definition of intent for 
intentional torts is beset by such problems, we should not be surprised if the law 
frequently fails to draw the necessary distinctions between intention and 
foresight (and killing and letting die). 
In The Foundations of Private Law, James Gordley shows how the modern 
common law of torts was only partially successful at incorporating categories of 
 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/the-pain-of-wrong-site-surgery/2011/06/07/ 
AGK3uLdH_story.html (noting a recent study indicating that the prevalence of surgeries on wrong 
body parts has not decreased in frequency and may actually be more common now than in the past). 
 84.  2 JOHN FINNIS, Intention in Tort Law, in THE COLLECTED ESSAYS OF JOHN FINNIS: 
INTENTION AND IDENTITY 198, 211 (2011) [hereinafter 2 FINNIS, Intention in Tort Law]; see also 2 JOHN 
FINNIS, Intention and Side Effects, in THE COLLECTED ESSAYS OF JOHN FINNIS: INTENTION AND 
IDENTITY, supra, at 173, 173 (2011) (“The distinction between what is intended and what is not 
intended but brought about as a side effect is at the basis of the vast modern law of tortious liability in 
negligence; it is the focus, too, of the criminal law’s long-accepted distinction between murder and 
manslaughter. As those facts suggest, it is not the esoteric preserve of some sectarian moral teaching, 
but a morally significant distinction which in intrinsic to practical reasonableness.”). 
 85.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965). 
 86.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 1 
(2010); see also Anthony J. Sebok, Purpose, Belief, and Recklessness: Pruning the Restatement (Third)’s 
Definition of Intent, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1165 (2001). 
 87.  See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 
105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914). 
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tort liability inherited from the civil law. As the common law of torts moved 
from the formalism of writs to today’s tort law with causes of action, levels of  
liability, and so forth, it tried to pour the civil law account of “wrong” (delict)  
into the mold of English common law. As Gordley argues, the Roman jurists 
based liability for tort (delictus) on the category of Aristotelian commutative 
justice. For Aristotle (and later commentators such as Aquinas), commutative 
(rather than distributive) justice required that when one took something from 
another unlawfully, then one was required to restore (make compensation for) 
the loss. Drawing on Roman sources, the civil law developed an account of 
commutative justice in both voluntary (contracts) and involuntary (torts) 
transactions: “If one citizen is involuntarily deprived of resources by another, 
commutative justice requires the person who did so to restore his victim’s share 
of resources.”88 Civil lawyers interpreted these categories with the aid, Gordley 
argues, of Aristotelian and late scholastic accounts of justice: “By voluntarily 
harming the plaintiff, [the defendant] has chosen to use the plaintiff’s resources 
for his own ends.”89 As John Goldberg has argued, the 
broader, medieval usage [of “tort”] as a synonym for “wrong” or “trespass” also 
persisted. Even jurists who did not use tort in the first sense seem to have recognized 
the department of law to which “tort,” in that usage, referred. They merely used 
different labels for it, such as the law of “private wrongs,” “personal wrongs,” or 
“delict.”
90
 
What is the “wrong” that a defendant commits when he intentionally inflicts 
a battery on a plaintiff? For the Aristotelian tradition, the wrong is based in the 
defendant’s fulfillment of his will, where an intent to cause harm is willed. The 
defendant who “fulfills his will” is liable because a will to cause harm is unjust 
insofar as it violates the equality of commutative justice.91 The fact that a 
“plaintiff has suffered a loss” is independent of the claim that a “defendant 
should be liable.”92 Gordley argues that a concern only with the defendant’s 
conduct “will conceive of tort law as an indirect way of accomplishing ends that 
 
 88.  JAMES GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVATE LAW: PROPERTY, TORT, CONTRACT, UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT 161 (2006). 
 89.  Id. at 183. 
 90.  John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 516 (2003); see also id. at 
516–17 (“[L]ate eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century jurists operated with a certain conception of 
‘tort.’ To them, tort was the part of the civil side of common law that identified, and provided redress 
for, injurious wrongs committed by a citizen—or, in certain instances, a state actor—against another.”). 
 91.  See 3 FINNIS, Intention in Tort Law, supra note 84, at 214 (“Common, non-utilitarian 
morality’s principle that one must never choose (intend) harm to the person of any human individual 
both expresses and preserves the understanding that each human individual is more than just a locus of 
utility or wealth (to be measured at some arbitrarily chosen future moment), or a channel or conduit 
for maximizing that wealth or utility (again, a maximum as measured at some chosen future moment). 
It expresses and preserves each individual’s density, so to speak, or dignity, if you will, as an equal of 
everyone else in basic rights. To choose harm to the person is paradigmatic wrong, the exemplary 
instance of denial of right.”). 
 92.  See Jules L. Coleman, Property, Wrongfulness and the Duty to Compensate, 63 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 451, 461 (1987). 
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are directly addressed by criminal law: deterring the defendant from harming  
others or punishing him.”93 (Such is the view of many law and economics  
scholars of tort law, who regard tort law as an elaborate means of regulating 
risks posed by would-be defendants’ conduct.)94 But if, Gordley argues, one is 
concerned only with the plaintiff’s loss, it does not seem to matter whether the 
defendant acted intentionally or not. An account centrally concerned with 
commutative justice is at pains to show both why this (intentionally 
wrongdoing) defendant should be liable for the harm inflicted on this plaintiff. 
This account of intentional wrongdoing and its tight relation to commutative 
justice was gradually displaced by moral skepticism about tort law. “[T]he 
traditional account,” writes Goldberg, “supposed that, by applying legal rules, 
principles, and concepts in this manner, judges and jurors were bringing to bear 
social norms of responsibility that had been refined and elaborated over time 
through lawyerly analysis.”95 Benjamin Zipursky and Goldberg have argued that 
it was Holmes who injected a dose of American pragmatism into the common 
law of torts and thereby turned torts from a common law system of 
commutative justice into a regulatory scheme: 
In [Holmes’s] view, tort law, like all common law, was essentially regulatory; it was a 
device that the state employed to advance a particular set of public goals—in this case, 
the goals of deterring harmful conduct and indemnifying citizens for invasions of their 
security. . . . [M]odern tort law could not be described as reflecting or enforcing moral 
or conventionally-recognized duties owed by one citizen to another. In modern 
societies, there were no such duties. Instead, the courts imposed liability for 
unreasonable conduct because they had concluded that it was the only rule that 
provided deterrence and compensation without unduly interfering with individual 
freedom.
96
 
With this change over the course of the twentieth century, tort law became 
less and less focused on corrective justice for wrongful actions by a defendant 
toward a particular plaintiff and more focused on compensation and deterrence 
as part of an overall scheme of regulation. One aspect of this change was a 
diminishment in blurring the line between intentional torts and negligence, most 
clearly expressed in the ascription of intention to cases involving substantially 
certain foreknowledge97 but also as expressed in some formulations of law and  
 
 93.  GORDLEY, supra note 88, at 184. 
 94.  See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT 
LAW (1987). 
 95.  Id. at 518. 
 96.  John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of Macpherson, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 
1733, 1755–56 (1998). 
 97.  See Anthony J. Sebok, Purpose, Belief, and Recklessness, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1165, 1173 (2001) 
(“[A]ny serious application of the belief prong requires us to engage in strange verbal contortions. The 
strangest of all, of course, is the concept of “substantial certainty” itself, which, like Voltaire’s God, 
seems to have been invented out of necessity, since it resembles no intuitively familiar mental state and 
is famously difficult to explain to skeptical first year students who have not yet checked their common 
sense at the law school’s front door. It is something less than certainty (which would be too strong) and 
more than highly probable (which would be too weak, and would collapse the whole category into 
recklessness). It is a concept, which, having no fixed meaning, can . . . mean whatever a judge wants.”). 
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economics.98 James Henderson and Aaron Twerski argue that “the way to avoid  
difficulty is to conceptualize acts as ‘volitional,’ rather than necessarily 
‘intended,’ thereby allowing the concepts of intent and recklessness to focus on 
the consequences of acts, rather than on the acts themselves.”99 What is lost, 
however, is the reality of the moral judgments underlying tort law’s structure of 
liability for intentional harms.100 
IV 
CONCLUSION: INTENTION AND PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE 
We are now able to assess briefly the costs of this confusion over intention in 
the field of bioethics and the law, with a particular focus on debates over end-of-
life treatment. In a contemporary manifestation of this loss of intelligibility 
around intention in the context of bioethics and the law, consider the debate 
over physician-assisted suicide. In 1997, the Supreme Court rejected due process 
and equal protection challenges to state law prohibitions on physician-assisted 
suicide. In the first case, Glucksberg v. Washington, the Court considered a due 
process claim against Washington’s assisted suicide statute. A panel opinion of 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was written by Judge 
John T. Noonan, Jr., himself no stranger to the topic of intention.101 In the Ninth 
Circuit case, Compassion in Dying v. Washington,102 the appellate court reviewed 
a district court ruling that the plaintiff patients and physicians were deprived of 
due process and denied equal protection by the Washington statute. Rejecting 
the view that the Supreme Court’s decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey had 
expanded the scope of due process liberty to include all decisions affecting 
personal autonomy, Judge Noonan wrote that “[a]ny reader of judicial opinions 
knows that they often attempt a generality of expression and a sententiousness 
 
 98.  See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 119 (2d ed. 1977) (“Most accidental 
injuries are intentional in the sense that the injurer knew that he could have reduced the probability of 
the accident by taking additional precautions.”). 
 99.  James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Intent and Recklessness in Tort: The Practical 
Craft of Restating the Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1133, 1137 (2001); see also id. at 1138 (“Assuming that a 
distinction has been successfully drawn between volition (part of the meaning of “act”) and intent 
(relating to the consequences of acts); and that, properly conceived, intent is neither necessarily linked 
with tangible harm nor inherently wrongful; one must still identify the state(s) of mind that constitute 
intent on the part of an actor to cause a particular consequence of an act. Upon reflection, two (and 
only two) states of mind qualify. An actor intends the consequence of an act when the actor desires that 
consequence to follow; and an actor intends the consequence, even if the actor does not desire the 
consequence, if she is aware that the consequence is certain to follow and goes ahead and acts with that 
awareness.”). 
 100.  4 JOHN FINNIS, A Grand Tour of Legal Theory, in THE COLLECTED ESSAYS OF JOHN FINNIS: 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, 91, 138–39 (2011) (“Tort law’s distinctive project of compensation is clearly 
dependent on a set of judgments about what forms of interaction between persons are acceptable 
within a given community. The backbone of tort is a set of moral—natural law—principles identifying as 
wrongful all choices precisely to harm or to deceive.”). 
 101.  See NOONAN, supra note 14, at 459 (discussion of direct and indirect intention). 
 102.  49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995). 
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of phrase that extend far beyond the problem addressed.”103 Because a right to 
physician-assisted suicide has never been recognized, “[u]nless the federal 
judiciary is to be a floating constitutional convention, a federal court should not  
invent a constitutional right unknown to the past and antithetical to the defense  
of human life that has been a chief responsibility of our constitutional 
government.”104 
 Judge Noonan’s opinion is an especially helpful survey of the possible 
arguments offered on behalf of the state’s interest in prohibiting assisted 
suicide. First, the state has an “interest in not having physicians in the role of 
killers of their patients.”105 As argued more elaborately by Leon Kass, among 
others, legal permission for physician-assisted suicide would transform the 
nature of the medical profession and present a marked transformation in the 
role of physicians in their relationships with patients.106 Second, the state has an 
interest in protecting patients from “psychological pressure to consent to their 
own deaths.”107 Financial pressures on families and despair over terminal 
conditions might lead to coercion that would make the choice for assisted 
suicide less than fully autonomous.108 Third, the state is legitimately concerned 
with protecting the poor and minorities from exploitation and manipulation. 
Fourth, the disabled would be especially vulnerable to pressure to avail 
themselves of assisted suicide. In the 1990s, this argument gave rise to a 
concerted anti-euthanasia effort among the disability rights community. Fifth, 
the state is legitimately worried that there might be a slippery slope from 
permitting terminally ill patients to have the aid of a physician in committing 
suicide to giving the same option to suffering (but not terminally ill) competent 
patients, and finally, to involuntary euthanasia. 
An en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit vacated Judge Noonan’s opinion. 
Writing for the court, Judge Stephen Reinhardt began his analysis of the liberty 
interest by positing “the fact that we have previously failed to acknowledge the 
existence of a particular liberty interest or even that we have previously 
prohibited its exercise is no barrier to recognizing its existence.”109 Building on 
the Supreme Court’s decisions in Casey and Cruzan, the en banc Ninth Circuit 
held that terminally ill patients have a due process liberty interest in procuring 
the aid of a physician in ending their lives. The Ninth Circuit panel also rejected  
 
 103.  Id. at 590. 
 104.  Id. at 591. 
 105.  Id. at 592. 
 106.  Leon R. Kass, Neither for Love nor Money: Why Doctors Must Not Kill, 94 PUB. INT. 25  
(1989). 
 107. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 592. 
 108.  The role of “autonomy” in the assisted suicide debate and in bioethics more generally is much 
contested. Two very fine treatments of the topic are CARL E. SCHNEIDER, THE PRACTICE OF 
AUTONOMY: PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND MEDICAL DECISIONS (1998) and ONORA O’NEILL, 
AUTONOMY AND TRUST IN BIOETHICS (2002). 
 109.  Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 805 (9th Cir. 1996). 
03_MORELAND_CORRECTED (DO NOT DELETE) 11/19/2012  3:57 PM 
No. 4 2012] MISTAKES ABOUT INTENTION 73 
 
any plausible basis for distinguishing between withholding or withdrawing  
treatment and physician-assisted suicide.110 
Similar litigation against New York’s prohibition on assisted suicide began 
when Dr. Timothy Quill, who had written a controversial piece in the New 
England Journal of Medicine describing an assisted suicide, filed suit. The 
Second Circuit did not follow the Ninth Circuit’s lead in concluding that there 
was a Fourteenth Amendment due process liberty interest in assisted suicide, 
but it did agree that the statutory prohibition against assisted suicide violated 
the Equal Protection clause. The court reasoned that the longstanding right to 
refuse medical treatment—which dates back to Judge Cardozo’s opinion in 
Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hospital—results in an unequal treatment of 
patients in end-of-life settings. A competent patient who seeks to refuse medical 
treatment or removal of life sustaining treatment is protected under New York 
law. The patient who cannot hasten his death in such a manner, though, and 
seeks instead to have the assistance of a physician in ending his life is not given 
such a right under New York law: 
[I]t seems clear that New York does not treat similarly circumstanced persons alike: 
those in the final stages of terminal illness who are on life-support systems are allowed 
to hasten their deaths by directing the removal of such systems; but those who are 
similarly situated, except for the previous attachment of life-sustaining equipment, are 
not allowed to hasten death by self-administering prescribed drugs.
111
 
Underlying the court’s reasoning is an assault on the distinction between 
killing and letting die, which has been a familiar argument in the bioethical 
literature.112 The court seized on the argument from the district court that there 
is a difference between “allowing nature to take its course,” on the one hand, 
and hastening death, on the other. But “there is nothing ‘natural’ about causing 
death by means other than the original illness or its complications,” the court 
argues, and the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment “hastens . . . death by 
means that are not natural in any sense. It certainly cannot be said that the 
death that immediately ensues is the natural result of the progression of disease 
or condition from which the patient suffers.”113 Withdrawing medical treatment,  
 
 
 110.  Id. at 822–23 (“The distinctions suggested by the state do not individually or collectively serve 
to distinguish the medical practices society currently accepts. The first distinction—the line between 
commission and omission—is a distinction without a difference now that patients are permitted not 
only to decline all medical treatment, but to instruct their doctors to terminate whatever treatment,  
artificial or otherwise, they are receiving. In disconnecting a respirator, or authorizing its disconnection, 
a doctor is unquestionably committing an act; he is taking an active role in bringing about the patient’s 
death. In fact, there can be no doubt that in such instances the doctor intends that, as the result of his 
action, the patient will die an earlier death than he otherwise would.”). 
 111.  Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 729 (2d Cir 1996). 
 112.  Much of the current debate derives from James Rachel’s 1975 article, Active and Passive 
Euthanasia, 292 NEW ENG. J. MED. 75 (1975). For a thorough treatment of the issue, see Daniel Patrick 
Sulmasy, Killing and Allowing to Die (July 20, 1995) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown 
University). 
 113.  Quill, 80 F.3d at 729. 
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in the view of the Second Circuit, “is nothing more nor less than assisted 
suicide.”114 
 The Supreme Court decided both the Ninth Circuit due process challenge 
and the Second Circuit equal protection challenge on the same day and rejected  
both arguments.115 The Court noted that “[t]hroughout the Nation, Americans  
are engaged in an earnest and profound debate about the morality, legality, and 
practicality of physician-assisted suicide. Our holding permits this debate to 
continue, as it should in a democratic society.”116 More importantly for our 
purposes, the Court rejected the Ninth and Second Circuits’ view that there is 
no relevant distinction between killing and letting die, let alone that permitting 
withdrawal–withholding of treatment, but prohibiting physician-assisted suicide, 
rises to the level of an equal protection violation. Writing for the Court, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist stated, “[W]e think the distinction between assisting suicide 
and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment a distinction widely recognized and 
endorsed in the medical profession and in our legal traditions, is both important 
and logical; it is certainly rational.”117 With that and some brief paragraphs 
asserting that the distinction “comports” with legal principles of “causation” and 
“intent,” the Court roundly rejected the Ninth and Second Circuits’ reasoning. 
Fourteen years later, doubts linger over the Supreme Court’s terse approval 
of the killing–letting-die distinction.118 In his book on euthanasia and assisted 
suicide, Neil Gorsuch reconstructs the Court’s adoption of the distinction and 
offers three proposed bases for it: (1) the distinction between act and omission, 
(2) causation, and (3) intention.119 He rejects the first two. Gorsuch views the 
act–omission distinction as inadequate. As Stephen Brock notes, “[N]on-
occurences and non-actions, to the extent they can be thought about and to that 
extent ‘are,’ can also be directly intended. . . . [I]f [an agent] intends not to do it, 
there is still some conduct involved . . . and to this extent the non-occurrence is 
pretty well assimilable to an action.”120 So also “the argument from causation 
wilts under examination,”121 which leaves everything to intention. That is 
precisely where Hauerwas pointed us forty years ago. 
The crucial question for the future is whether the concept of intention in the 
law of bioethics can continue to provide the basis for drawing a distinction 
between killing and letting die. As the character-constituting nature of our free 
and deliberate actions becomes obscured and confidence in the capacity of 
 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997). 
 116.  Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 735. 
 117.  Vacco, 521 U.S. at 800–01. 
 118.  See Steven D. Smith, De-Moralized: Glucksberg in the Malaise, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1571 (2008). 
 119.  NEIL M. GORSUCH, THE FUTURE OF ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA (2006). 
 120.  STEPHEN L. BROCK, ACTION AND CONDUCT: THOMAS AQUINAS AND THE THEORY OF 
ACTION 224 (1998). 
 121.  STEVEN D. SMITH, THE DISENCHANTMENT OF SECULAR DISCOURSE 48 (2008). 
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practical reason to genuinely choose (or elect responsibility for) goods becomes 
diminished, all that remains are acts causing consequences, whether intended or 
foreseen. Torts and bioethics, tort’s doctrinal child, race to keep up with these 
shifts in moral theory, obscuring and muddling the distinction between intention 
and foresight. As Hauerwas notes ruefully, “[W]e may have arrived at a time  
when we have achieved an unspeakable thing: a medical profession without a  
moral philosophy in a society without one either.”122 
 
 122.  STANLEY HAUERWAS, TRUTHFULNESS AND TRAGEDY: FURTHER INVESTIGATIONS INTO 
CHRISTIAN ETHICS 131 (1977). 
